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Abstract This article offers an analysis of the
emerging scalar configuration of the governance of
the European Union. It discusses how European
integration stands for a move from a collection of
territorially homogenous systems of rule towards a
new assemblage of territories, authorities and rights.
The paper first questions the stretchy territoriality of
the seemingly obvious European level. Second it
analyses the sectoral differences in the evolution of
the width and the depth of integration, measured as
the transfer of competencies to the EU level between
the Rome Treaty (1958) and the Lisbon Treaty
(200y). Third it turns to the day-to-day decision-
making to assess the relations between players in EU
governance and finally it looks more closely at the
administrative wheels of the EU machinery.
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Introduction
While, in the last 50 years, Europe has occasionally
been running, jumping, walking and stumbling in the
direction of ever closer union, directionless moves
have been made during large periods. Responsible
politicians have engaged in extended sur place
exercises and sometimes they have hit the ground.
Outcries against further steps toward European
integration have been heard. At the same time the
kernel of European cooperation that started in the
early 1950s among six countries at the Western side
of the postwar East-West divide, has tremendously
grown in its geographical extension and in other
dimensions. In this paper we look at this process as a
series of steps that contributed to the formation of a
novel polity. (Galtung 1973 for an early effort at
critical analysis; a broad historical-geographical nar-
rative providing opportunities for historical
comparison is Heffernan (1998).
We are in this instance primarily interested in the
basic political mechanisms of the current process that
result in: the variable geographical extension in the
practice of a European scale, the authority shifts
primarily across scales that bring a European polity
into being and the emerging practices that translate the
construction of a European scale level into a newly
networked system of multilevel governance (see in the
first place Marks 1993; Marks et al. 1996; Hooghe
1996; Hooghe and Marks 2003). In this paper we do not
aim at an exhaustive review of the literature, nor do we
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present a rounded analysis of a clearly demarcated,
freshly collected data-set. It is a conceptual paper
providing an empirically grounded theoretical inter-
pretation organized around some of the currently
central notions in the discussion on European cooper-
ation from a geographical perspective.
Viewing the institutionalization of a European
scale from the perspective of the scale debate in
geography (especially Swyngedouw 1997; Brenner
1998, 2001; Delaney and Leitner 1997; Cox 1998;
Marston 2000; Paasi 2002; Herod and Wright 2002,
Howitt 2003; Leitner 2004; Mamadouh et al 2004;
Sheppard and McMaster 2004; Jessop 2005; Marston
et al. 2005), it is key to acknowledge that the
establishment of a European level by definition
impacts the configuration of all existing scales in
that part of the world. The European level is not only
a new scale of government, it includes new relations
between scale levels, a system often referred to as
multi-level governance. The emergence of this new
system of rule in Europe represents a shift from the
modern or Westphalian state system to a state system
plus something extra whereby interstate, suprastate
and transnational cooperation affect and change
traditional state authority in different ways. The
general direction of this historical transformation is
widely accepted and debated, but where are we now?
What do we know about the functioning of the new
multi-scalar configuration of governance known as
the European Union?
This paper focuses on the European level of
governance in this configuration and its relations to
other scales. What could we mean when we refer to a
‘European level’ in the context of European gover-
nance? Most obviously there is always some
geographical extension implied but Europe lacks a
generally accepted delimitation.
To spot its European level, we have to look for
aspects of governance that show up as European by
way of impact range or representation. There may be
some dispute as to the governance relevance of some
actions compared to others. There can be hardly any
doubt that the realm of rights and obligations based
on authoritative decision-making forms the hard core
of the European governance level while a lot of
unsteadily framed activities are of more peripheral
importance.
Different types of authoritative European decision-
making are based on different geographical
extensions. This fundamentally differs from a system
of rule embodied in states. The European level brings
to life a set of new authorities, and therefore also a set
of new state transgressing networks, and a set of new
frames of reference. Europeanization, the process that
makes Europe relevant at the other scale levels, has
several meanings. It has also different directional
dynamics (up/download) depending on the actor
pushing Europeanization in a specific situation: local
or national actors can push the Europeanization of an
issue—bottom up—if they think they will be more
successful defending their interest or their ideas in the
European arena. Likewise supranational actors can
promote Europeanization from above to homogenize
conditions for different players in the European arena
across the different lower level scales (for example
the harmonization policies that flanked the realization
of the internal market ‘‘1992’’). As Europeanization
progresses, networking across scales is stimulated
and the initially neat distinction between scale levels
becomes fuzzy.
We distinguish three main dimensions of the
construction of the European level and the Europe-
anization of governance: time, space (as jurisdiction)
and sectors. These three dimensions are both obvious
and poorly researched. The sectoral segmentation of
governance is a striking feature of European gover-
nance as differences between policy sectors can be
extremely large when it comes to the competencies of
the European level or the role of the differently scaled
actors in the decision making process. Less obvious
and certainly worthy of much more empirical
research are the interconnections between the sectors
and their dynamics. This implies an interest in the
sequence and timing of these processes.
Regarding the time dimension more generally, the
obvious shifts across (many) sectors at some critical
junctures need to be reconstructed: were they planned
from above or the result of spontaneous aggrega-
tions? Did they involve directed changes or
evolutionary transformations like spillovers from
one sector to the other?
Finally the spatial dimension provokes an obvious
demand for further analysis. The varying territorial
domains of European governance add up to a
confusing array of temporary territorialities that
differs from the typical hard-edged integral territori-
ality that is so characteristic of the modern nation-
state. We have moved from a series of territorially
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homogenous systems of rule to a still impermanent
assemblage of territories, authorities and rights as
drawn up by Sassen for a number of other cases
(Sassen 2006).
This article aims at assessing the evolution of the
kernel of EU governance by considering first the
construction of a European level per se and then some
aspects of the processes of Europeanization that
connect scale levels in a new fashion It aims at
offering a more subtle analysis of the emerging scalar
configuration within Europe than those that decide
too quickly for a sequence of successive stages of
integral integration as a result of the transfer of
competences to a European level. This refers e.g. to
both sides in the intergovernmentalism/supranation-
alism debate where opinions only differ as regards
levels and rates of overall integration. To achieve this
aim the paper discloses the complexity of the new
scalar arrangements by reviewing and comparing
shifting arrangements in different policy sectors
based on the important classificatory efforts of earlier
scholars plus some indications for the transgression
of traditional levels that has accompanied the
construction of a European level per se.
The article first explores the successive and some-
times sectorally differentiated geographical domains
of European cooperation, often jurisdictions, and
emphasizes the different and always changing geo-
graphical extension that this round of European
cooperation has continuously demonstrated. In the
next section we look at the transfer of competencies to
the EU level (the making of a jurisdiction) and the
prescribed role of supranational actors in the ensuing
processes of European decision- making. Building
upon Bo¨rzel’s work on the width and the depth of
integration as a meaningful way to interpret differences
between policy sectors (Bo¨rzel 2005), we show how
integration evolves and increases resulting in an ever
more distinctive European level, that nonetheless
remains of variable importance among policy sectors.
In the following section we attempt to go beyond an
assessment based on the outcomes of disputes between
major contenders concerning competencies and the
implied procedural roles at critical junctures. Building
upon the work by Thomson et al. (2006) on recent
instances of ordinary decision making in the EU, we
discuss the apparent culture of decision-making that
has emerged within the EU that goes far beyond the
formal players and procedures prescribed in the
ultimate stages of those decisions. To elaborate on
this, we then turn to the administrative backstage of the
political decision making process. Very few studies
scrutinize the administrative wheels of the EU machin-
ery. The collection of essays edited by Hofmann and
Tu¨rk (2006a, b, c) is an example (see also Nugent 2001;
Stevens 2001; Wakefield 2007). They show the
importance and the actual practice of the administra-
tions in the different stages of decision-making and
they strongly emphasize the intertwining of the
EU-administrations at the European level and those
at originally other levels transforming the procedures
at all these levels in a new integrated European
administration. Finally we reflect on our results in
terms of general processes of institutional
development.
The seemingly obvious European level:
geographical extensions
The European level is unlike most established
scales—the national certainly, the local often—not
taken for granted in social and political life. While its
legitimacy is often openly disputed, its existence is
often assumed as a distant but real and paradoxally
vague entity. One reason for this lack of salience,
though certainly not the only one, is the changing and
variable extension of Europe in the context of
European governance against the background of
general, rarely well articulated, notions of essential
Europeanness.
Demarcating the European level in geographical
terms has always been difficult. Jacques Le´vy has
stated that still at the present time the European level
can be determined in a number of ways between the
European urban core and the globe. Thinking about
European space provokes a permanent gymnastics to
look for the proper units (Le´vy 1997, p. 263). Even if
we narrow the search for the European level to those
forms of cooperation emanating from the modes of
European cooperation that go under the aegis of the
current European Union and its immediate predeces-
sors, there is a wide variation in possible demarcations.
This refers not merely to the successive geographical
extensions of this type of European cooperation from
the initial six countries of 1951–1957 to the extensions
of 1973, 1981, 1986, 1995, 2004, 2007 (Map 1). It also
refers to the various demarcations of vital ingredients
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of that cooperation which also implies a heterogeneous
basis of the ruling authority/ies (Mamadouh 2001).
Map 2 draws some of the current differences. They
have also changed over time. There have been recent
changes in the adherents of the Schengen agreement
(that even covers non-member states) concerning
border traffic of persons and in the countries that are
part of the Eurozone.
So the European level is a jurisdiction of variable
dimension. As a political actor in the wider world the
EU is also variable, as it can speak in the name of a
variable collection of member states (for 27 in WTO,
Map 1 The varying
geographical dimension of
the European level: The
continuing extension from 6
member states in 1952 to 27
in 2007. Note: The territory
of the former German
Democratic Republic
became part of the EC12 in
1990 with German
reunification
Map 2 The currently varying geographical dimensions of the
European level: Coexisting extensions of EU27, Eurozone and
Schengenland. Note: Most EU member states are part of the
Eurozone and Schengenland (including older and newer ones
such as Slovenia and Malta), Cyprus too, but the implemen-
tation of Schengen is not yet completed; Ireland is part of the
Eurozone but not Schengenland. Another large group of EU
member states are part of Schengen but do not yet use the Euro
(all joined in 1995 or 2004); the two most recent member states
have not yet implemented Schengen and do not yet use the
Euro; and the UK does not participate in any of them. Finally
two outsiders are part of Schengen and two are about to
implement it (Switzerland and Liechtenstein)
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in environmental negotiations and as a donor in
development programmes but for a smaller though in
fact hazy number in military matters, and for 15 in
monetary matters on the basis of a jointly accepted
euro). The EU is represented on these occasions by
different spokes-persons, that are not always clearly
coordinated in a formal fashion (the President of the
Commission, the President of the European Council,
the High Representative for the CFSP, the President
of the European Central Bank, the Commissioner for
Trade). The EU level is a playground for diverse
players of which only some have a specifically
European territorial range, such as the treaty-based
European institutions. The other players include
territorially institutionalised actors as states and
political and administrative regions (including
cross-border regions and states external to the EU);
nationally regionally or locally organised interest
groups, political parties and NGOs; transnational
ones; as well as non-territorially organised actors
such as corporations and epistemic communities. The
EU also comes to life as an arena of variable
dimension or perhaps as a set of arenas. The players
have their encounters in various places epitomized by
the establishment of the major EU institutions in
three different cities (Brussels, Luxemburg and
Strasbourg). But there are many more arenas where
EU encounters take shape, e.g. at places where
agencies settle and engage with other parties and at
temporary meeting places e.g. of the European
Council.
All in all, the territory under the jurisdiction of the
European level has dramatically increased from the
early 1950s till the present, expanding from a core
area of six relatively similar Western European states
that in this way overcame their recent murderous
adversities to a common organization of almost all
the states of the continent, with all the others (Belarus
excepted) involved in some kind of agreement with
the European Union. The repeatedly shifting shape of
this Europe is at least slightly confusing. The
simultaneous coexistence of diverging territorial
shapes for different policies is even more difficult
to communicate and to legitimate, for its fuzzy
geography and as it results in simultaneous different
configurations of players. For example, the UK is a
major player in EU decision-making, it is one of the
two key players of military Europe but it is at the
same time self excluded from decisions that pertain to
the Eurozone. Not only does the European level
consist of a bewildering array of players in different
configurations, they also congregate in a whole series
of arenas. This also does not contribute to the salience
and finally the authority of the European level. While
the European Union is often portrayed and perceived
as an unproblematic if somewhat fuzzy entity, it is in
fact appropriate to see it as an intangible social unit
that largely lacks permanence and struggles with a
number of simultaneously different geographical
delimitations. The union is still to a considerable
extent a project. As a union, it is in the circles that
support it an imagined fact of life.
The authority shifts that contributed to European
level formation
In the course of time several arrangements for
decision-making have been developed at the Euro-
pean level. In each case the European level is the
arena, the place from where effects of actors’
practices reach all parts of a perceived European
territory, a place also that supposedly embodies the
representation of Europe. The current set of arrange-
ments is as follows:
• The so-called community method (with the EU as
jurisdiction, the EU as arena, and EU institutions
as the Commission, the Council, the Parliament,
and the Court of Justice as key actors);
• The intergovernmental procedure (with the EU
with slight exceptions of inclusion and exclusion
as jurisdiction, and also as arena and the member
states as key actors);
• The open method of coordination (OMC) (with
the member states as jurisdictions, the EU as
arena, and the member states as key actors) (see
Caporaso and Wittenbrinck 2006, p. 474; Borra´s
and Jacobson 2004; Duina and Raunio 2007).
The community method defines the original core
of the European level. It assumes the major EU
institutions and prescribes their action spaces through
the consultation and later the co-decision procedures
that are distinguished by the increasing legislative
role of the European Parliament. In the intergovern-
mental procedure a modern version of traditional
congress diplomacy should result in new agreements
for the EU area. Their modern elements are the
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involvement of the Commission as an extremely well
prepared and expert neutral party. The open method
of coordination engages member states in processes
of mutual assessment and learning after they have
commonly agreed on a far reaching goal (like
collectively becoming the most productive economy
in the world). In the intergovernmental procedure and
the open method of coordination the European organs
and particularly the Commission at its centre try to
perform as coach and honest broker.
Europe’s system of multilevel governance with its
newly developed European level has taken its current
shape over the last half century and it still evolves. At
every point in time it functions as a result of
repeatedly renewed basic treaty negotiations in a
series of Intergovernmental Conferences. These have
resulted in the slow, but steady expansion and
refinement of the community method across the
different policy areas of European cooperation. This
implies ever adapted official roles, a new attribution
of competences and authorities and revised rules of
the game.
The various stages of the construction of the
European level of the European governance system
have been conveniently summarized by Bo¨rzel (2005).
She describes the changes in the different policy
sectors as regards the distribution of competences
among the different levels as changing levels of
integration. On the basis of an earlier table produced
by Hix (2005) eighteen policy sectors were character-
ized in terms of the width and depth of integration at
different moments in time. Width refers to the propor-
tion of competencies in a policy sector to be treated at
European Community/Union level, depth refers to the
involvement of supranational bodies (commission,
parliament, court) and the voting rules in the council as
spelled out in the treaties. All policy sectors are scored
on a 0–5 scale on these dimensions of integration
following the information in the respective treaties on
the following dates: 1958 (Rome), 1987 (SEA), 1993
(Maastricht), 1999 (Amsterdam), 2003 (Nice) and
some undisclosed date in the not too distant future
when the Lisbon Treaty enters into force. In fact the
calculations have been based on the Constitutional
Treaty text of 2004. As far as we are aware the Lisbon
Treaty is not different in the aspects that are relevant for
these calculations.
Figure 1 shows the evolving overall formal inte-
gration (the relative concentration of authority at the
European level) along these two dimensions by
summing all scores per dimension and converting to
a scale 0–100. Apart from the obvious difficulties in
scoring all these policy sectors in a comparative
fashion, two additional problems should be stressed.
The demarcation of policy sectors changes over time
and we cannot be quite sure that the same policy field is
covered consistently. In addition, it may well be the
case that not all potential policy sectors have thus been
covered (e.g. much of what goes under the label of
spatial planning and housing in the Netherlands cannot
be properly positioned). In other words, a score of 100
does not necessarily mean complete integration across
the entire range of governmental competences. But as
one moves through the list, the impression is none-
theless that a lot of ground has been covered.
From Fig. 1 one can draw a number of conclu-
sions. In both dimensions, integration increases over
time. The process may have slowed down on several
occasions; so far, it has never gone in the opposite
direction. At the time of the Rome Treaty nearly a
third of the entire integration process in terms of
width had been covered in the initial step with the
depth trailing behind. In other words, relatively
speaking, the institutional provisions that are neces-
sary to deal with the tasks have only been established
in a piecemeal fashion. This is largely made good at
the time of the Single European Act. From that time
until the Maastricht Treaty the integration process
moves forward at an accelerated rate along these two




































Fig. 1 Width and depth of European integration among 18
policy sectors: Percentage of maximum possible overall score.
Source: Calculation based on Bo¨rzel’s assessment of 19 policy
sectors (Bo¨rzel 2005, pp. 222–223)
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creation of the necessary institutional provisions in
fact takes already a slight advance over the extension
of the policy field covered. This difference becomes
more pronounced at the time of the Nice Treaty and
even slightly more in the Constitutional/Lisbon
Treaty. After Maastricht the increase in integration
in terms of the extension of the terrain covered, has
been small. But one should keep in mind that it was
even smaller during the long period of time from the
Rome Treaty to the Single European Act. In the
meantime European integration has (in a much larger
Union) progressed significantly. The emphasis has
been on deepening the integration in fields that had
already been brought under the aegis of the European
level. For the policy issues covered, the process has
deepened to more than three quarters of the whole
range, a fourfold increase over the level at the initial
stage.
In fact the overall increase in integration in two
dimensions consists of 18 times two processes in the
different policy sectors. What about the similarities
and differences among these sectors? Do we have
early innovators that remain in an advanced degree of
integration over time, mainstream sectors that follow
suit and laggards staying behind which would suggest
emulation and spillovers in variations of a diffusion
process, in short some kind of overall system; or is
this a less tidy set of processes, each policy sector
driven by its own dynamics? In order to reduce the
variation in the data all scores were put in three
categories: high (over 3,5), middle (over 1,5 until 3,5)
and low (0–1,5). Positions at the time of the Rome
Treaty were then compared to those that resulted
from the abortive Constitutional treaty of 2004, that is
as far as we know in these respects equal to the
results of the upcoming Lisbon Treaty. The shift that
we portray is a process of half a century. As there turn
out to be no policy sectors in which integration on
either of these two dimensions decreases over time,
we get six different trajectories for width and six for
depth (LL, LM, LH, MM, MH, HH). In Tables 1 and
2 we show the positions of the 18 different policy
areas for the two dimensions of integration at the start
and at the end of our period.
The slightly lower initial level of the depth of
integration compared to the width and the quicker pace
of the increase of depth does show up again in these
figures. A shift of one class upwards over this time
period is more or less the ‘normal’ pace of integration
during this period in the width dimension. It applies to
11 out of 18 cases (10 moved one category upward,
while one, that started already in the highest category
could not rise higher and can therefore also be
considered as ‘normal’). However, in the depth
dimension only six cases move one category upward.
By far the largest single class moves two classes up
from a low position at the time of the Rome Treaty.
Integration in four policy sectors in the width dimen-
sion stagnates, and three sectors show a steep growth
rate. Integration in two sectors in the depth dimension
stagnates and 10 show a steep growth rate.
Apparently the presence of an overall trend
suggests a systemic process of integration. There is
not a single one among these 36 cases where
integration over this half century has diminished. At
the same time initial differences among policy areas
are by no means all maintained over time. Agriculture
has been the permanent frontrunner. It was the only
policy sector that had a high score on the width
dimension right from 1958 and the depth of integra-
tion moved from a middle score in 1958 that it then
only shared with three other policy sectors in the
domain of Economic Affairs to a high score half a
century later. Currently four more policy sectors have
reached a high score in the width and depth
dimension simultaneously. Together with Agriculture
they are now the frontrunners of integration. They are
Table 1 Levels of integration in width dimension for 18







Low in 1958 3 7 3 13
Middle in 1958 X 1 3 4
High in 1958 X X 1 1
Source: Calculation based on assessment in Bo¨rzel 2005,
pp. 222–223
Table 2 Levels of integration in depth dimension for 18







Low in 1958 1 3 10 14
Middle in 1958 X 1 3 4
High in 1958 X X X 0
Source: Calculation based on assessment in Bo¨rzel 2005,
pp. 222–223
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Environment and Consumer Protection, Occupational
Health and Safety Standards, Territorial, Economic
and Social Cohesion and Monetary Policy. They
originate from different initiatives in the history of
European cooperation and have apparently acquired
this frontrunner position for different reasons.
Territorial, Economic and Social Cohesion is the
policy area most relevant to spatial planning and
housing which is an issue area of central concern in
other papers in this collection (notably those by Gore,
Johnson and Dukes). It is now among the few most
integrated policy areas. However, sustained efforts to
bring spatial planning up to the European level
(Faludi and Waterhout 2002) have so far only met
with moderate success. At the same time within the
field of housing there is in the Netherlands a dispute
about the position of housing associations vis a` vis
European rules of unfettered competition. In short,
integration levels and the demarcation of policy areas
should be looked at carefully for what they imply.
At the other extreme one policy area has remained
a laggard in both dimensions: Tax The tax systems as
basic mainstays of the state’s existence are still
largely out of bounds for authorities transgressing the
state level in the EU. It is interesting that this does not
apply to other existential attributes of the state’s
existence that have often been put under the label
‘high politics’. This distinction again introduced by
Bo¨rzel (2005) to account for a major part of the
differences among the policy sectors turns out to be
less relevant. They have been addressed under the
second and the third pillar in the Maastricht Treaty
but do not show up as a specific class of policy areas
in this analysis in terms of the integration trajectories
covered. In other words, the basic logic of the treaties
in terms of the three pillars does not translate in
actual classes of integration trajectories based on the
more detailed contents of these same treaties. As it
turns out, the dynamics of each policy sector
contribute to a considerable extent to the course of
their integration process despite the systemic charac-
teristics of the overall process.
The European level and the processes
of Europeanization
As European cooperation incrementally developed
over the years, every new institutional compromise
prescribed a renewed general plan for the day-to-day
decision-making of the European institutions follow-
ing the community method in terms of rules and
procedures. At the same time the repertory of
decision-making mechanisms widened. The number
of intergovernmentalist instances of decision-making
increased under the second and third pillar and these
were thus also prescribed under treaty rules. Finally,
the Open Method of Coordination became a new
form of interaction involving the Economic Affairs
and Finance (ECOFIN) and Employment, Social
Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Councils (EP-
SCO) plus the Commission and its services (Neuhold
and Radulova 2006, pp. 60–65).
A recent study (Thomson et al. 2006, chapters by
Achen 2006, pp. 264–298, and by Schneider et al. 2006,
pp. 299–316 in particular) provides some important
insights concerning the process of decision-making in
ordinary non-constitutional cases in the EU following
the community method during 1999–2001, the period
after the Amsterdam Treaty had been agreed but before
Nice and the Constitutional Treaty episodes. The EU
had 15 member states at the time. Consequently, this
research refers to a stage in the evolution of the
European institutions when the different institutions and
their mutual relations had considerably matured, but
before the major extension of 2004 had occurred.
The study considered 66 Commission proposals that
in a reasonably short time ended in a final decision by
the Council or the Council and the European Parlia-
ment (in case they had to be treated under the co-
decision rules). It is a pity that we do not know from this
study why some proposals come to a final decision and
others do not. What the typical blockages were at the
time when the system was not yet put under renewed
strain by the massive entry of new member states in
2004, remains hidden. The proposals that were studied,
were distributed across all the relevant policy sectors.
The book consists of the construction and testing of
decision-making models, all variants of the rational
choice institutional approach: actors pursue their
preferences as best they can within the constraints of
the institutional environment in which they find
themselves. What were the outcomes, which models
performed better than others in terms of proper
forecasts of the final decisions, how did the EU (if it
followed the community method) decide?
Models that only take into account the procedures
to be followed and consider the decision as a vote
26 GeoJournal (2008) 72:19–31
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where all participants try to make maximum gains in
every individual decision, do badly. This is not how
the EU following the community method works. In
fact decisions reflect each member’s preferences, and
those of more powerful members often somewhat
more. This apparently results from cooperative bar-
gaining. Irrespective of the voting rules in the
particular case (qualified majority voting for
instance) there is a strong orientation to end up with
a unanimous vote by a decision in which every
participant finds enough positive points to support it.
Exchanges among parties within the context of the
initial proposal, smaller scale coalitions and
exchanges of advantages across proposals increase
the support for proposals. In addition, numerous
negotiations before and during the decision-making
by various factors may smoothen its path. Non-
cooperative styles of bargaining where threats are
used are unhelpful in accounting for actual EU-
decision-making. Finally, it is interesting that there
are not only no differences in this regard between the
areas where there are procedural differences, but also
no differences between decisions in the different
issue areas. The EU-level preference for maximal
support in cases where the community method
applies, is indeed an EU-level finding.
In the years around 2000 cooperative bargaining
kept the flow of new EU rules running. This pattern
was probably set during an extended previous period
in which the oft repeated games that had to result in
new legislation had to be played again and again.
This resulted in informal common norms and expec-
tations in each case, but also in the possibilities of
informal exchanges during successive games. The
earlier rounds of new accessions that brought ever
new participants to the table, had apparently been
successfully accomodated in this respect. This must
at least to some extent have resulted from the
relatively stable administrative background that was
part of the policy process. These administrations had
long developed working procedures and effectively
integrated newcomers despite growing diversity
reflecting the increasingly varied political cultures
from which the participants emanated.
Vital administrative institutions like the top func-
tionaries in the directorates-general, the cabinets in
the Commissioner’ s offices and the legal services
division of the Commission plus the Secretary
General and his staff of the Council plus the
COREPER gatherings of permanent representatives
of the member states in Brussels that prepared the
decisions of the Council in its different compositions
provided the necessary continuous capacity for
wheeling and dealing that enabled formal decisions.
As the European Parliament has more emphatically
entered the decision-making loop with the extension
of the co-decision procedure the Commission has
engaged in informal ‘trialogues’ with representatives
of the Parliament and the Council to find common
ground for its policies at an early stage before an
official proposal is put forward.
The results of the study suggest that the most
important requirement in preserving the capacity to
act after the accession of so many new entrants was
perhaps less the procedural changes that got all the
limelight in Nice and the Constitution but perhaps
more the ability to play these cooperative games that
seem to be the essence of successful decision
processes in the EU. This is not merely a question
of providing rules and procedures that allow for these
outcomes, but just as much a cultural question about
ordering preferences and the normative preference for
certain courses of action over others. In addition,
some very practical assets have always been needed.
The so-called ‘diplomatic sherpas’ (not only profes-
sional diplomats but also administrators with
diplomatic skills) are a vital ingredient of all deci-
sion-making in this heterogeneous and ever widening
arena where European players intermingle with actors
with a more limited geographical range and with
actors whose ranges transgress European boundaries,
to maintain and strengthen the European level juris-
diction(s). If these pre-conditions suffice under ever
enlarged actor numbers remains to be seen.
Hofmann and Tu¨rk (2006a), in concentrating on
the evolution of the EU administrative apparatus and
the national level administrators involved in Euro-
pean business over time, provide some further
stepping stones for assessing the strength of the EU
level and its resilience to withstand new strains as
member state numbers increase. In their collection of
essays the ‘sherpas’ get profiled as the widening body
of administrators at the European and the national
level that plays an essential part in keeping European
cooperation working on a day to day basis. They call
it an integrated administration, be it of a novel kind.
They do not pay any attention to the lower admin-
istrative levels within member states where European
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orientations have gradually also become more prom-
inent (Dukes 2007, Chaps. 6 and 7 in particular).
The size of the administrative manpower at the
European level is still modest, not larger than the
civil service of a sizeable city within the Union. It
started from truly humble beginnings. A comparison
of numbers of employees in the different European
institutions in the period 1970–2003 according to data
from the Financial Report 2003 of the EU is shown in
Table 3.
These numbers have to be used with caution. They
are probably in fact somewhat larger, but the trend is
unmistakable. With the increase of the competences
at the European level, the supporting manpower has
considerably grown. The most impressive increases
have been with the institutions that not so much set
the agenda, make policy and implement it, but with
those primarily charged with control, assessment and
evaluation: the Court of Justice and the Auditors on
the one side and the European Parliament on the
other. Generally at a more gradual growth path the
support of the Council shows a steeper rate of
increase than that of the Commission. The Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions launched midway in this period (both
advisory) have seen their administrative support grow
as that of the Council.
The limited size of the administrations at the
European level have long been explained as the
consequence of the doctrine of executive federalism
that supposedly guided the development of the
administrative system of European cooperation. Fol-
lowing this doctrine policy issues that were deemed
to be European in nature, should be developed at the
European level and result in legally binding rules that
were then to be implemented by the administrations
of the member states. Consequently the European
level itself would not or hardly dispose of capacities
for implementation. This doctrine backed up by a
powerful early arrest of the European Court of Justice
(the Meroni-doctrine, 1958) has survived in law but
not in actual practice.
In fact, national administrations and those at the
European level have become increasingly intertwined
and are constantly engaged in joint deliberations that
aim to produce supranational government in the
context of a growing body of accepted rules and
practices within the EU. This results in an integrated
administration (resulting from these continuous delib-
erations) across levels (European and national) that
remains fragmented (between the levels but also
between policy sectors and between the different
parts of the policy process) and heterarchic (no single
hierarchy, various sources of authority). This inte-
grated administration has an evolutionary nature
(early stages condition the next ones, practices in
adjacent policy sectors may be transferred or spill
over, change is perpetual). The intertwining of the
European and national levels of administration results
in an ongoing process of Europeanization at the lower
level, necessarily also passed on to those parts that
are not directly involved in relations with the
European level. At the same time, the continuous
interaction of the European level with the lower
levels results in its turn in a steady process of
adaptation of the European character of the European
level (Hofmann and Tu¨rk 2006c, pp. 573–596).
Policies within any polity supposedly all pass
through a policy cycle consisting of a stage of agenda
setting, of decision-making and of implementation. In
the case of European cooperation the contribution of
administrators is vitally important in all the stages of
the policy cycle. And in all these stages the European
level and the national level are in a process of ever
more intimate interaction.
At the agenda-setting stage the Commission is still
a predominant player. It is supported by the direc-
torates-general that form the backbone of its services.
But long before the drafting of proposals has started,
Table 3 Staff of the community institutions and bodies:
comparison 1970–2003




Court of Justice (and Court of
Auditors in 2003)
140 1745 12.46
European Parliament 532 4960 9.32
Council 618 2919 4.72
Commission 7801 24315 3.12
Economic and Social
Committee (and Committee
of the Regions in 2003)
144 777 5.40
Total 9235 34716 3.76
Source: Calculation based on Neuhold and Radulova (2006,
p. 46) who refer to data supplied by the Commission in
Financial Report (2003, p. 118)
28 GeoJournal (2008) 72:19–31
123
issues have been discussed in expert groups that the
Commissioners install for the express purpose to
come up with new ideas. And provisional suggestions
have been circulated among lobbyists who make their
annotations. Lobbyists obviously may also come
forward with policy ideas that the Commissioners
may then take into account and pass on for further
consideration. The expert groups are to a consider-
able extent populated by national representatives with
or without a mandate. Directorate General Research
is particularly strong in mobilizing expert groups.
Nobody knows how many expert groups are in
existence at a given moment and the numbers
obviously fluctuate. Estimates of current numbers
are 800–1300 (Larsson and Trondal 2006, p. 19).
They have grown with the increase of the Union’s
competences, but it would be interesting to know
their rate of increase over time. Unfortunately we do
not.
What happens during the period of decision-
making (that may well take years, but may also be
achieved in matter of months) depends very much on
the role of the different institutions in the different
procedural paths that can be taken. In all procedures
under the community method the Council is of the
utmost importance in decision-making. There is a
permanent EU supporting staff, there are the civil
servants of the member states that are part of the
Brussels offices of the Permanent Representatives
and there are the members of the national bureau-
cracies that serve part time at the approximately 250
working parties to prepare the decisions of the two
COREPER bodies (Larsson and Trondal 2006, p. 26;
Neuhold and Radulova 2006, p. 50). They are the
portals of the Council under the community method
or act as precursors for the intergovernmental forms
of decision-making under the second and the third
pillar. Under the Open Method of Coordination four
differently structured preparatory bodies are at work.
Interestingly, their membership does not merely
cover nationals permanently based in Brussels and
delegates from national bureaucracies but also civil
servants who are part of the Commission services. In
fact, not only are the differences between national
and supranational parts of the administration com-
pletely blurred, this also applies to their origins
within the treaty-based institutions that supposedly
play completely different and separate roles in the
making of policy (Neuhold and Radulova 2006,
pp. 60–65). In the growing number of cases where
Parliament is involved in decision-making its largely
increased support staff helps Parliamentary Commis-
sions where much of the actual work occurs and it
helps rapporteurs in drafting reports and proposals.
These administrators are also active in the concilia-
tion procedures where the views of the Council and
the Parliament have to be brought in line with the
Commission proposals. To smoothen that process the
Commission has more recently engaged in informal
trialogues at the beginning of the decision-making
process in order to clarify the difficulties of the
decision-making process for all the partners from the
outset.
Despite the reluctance and opposition to the
European level becoming engaged in implementa-
tion, this has nonetheless happened in a number of
fields. As European rules have increased, so has their
implementation at a European wide scale. But again,
institutional features at the European level have
become narrowly intertwined with actors originating
at the national level and still permanently engaged
there as well (Hofmann and Tu¨rk 2006b, pp. 74–112,
particularly p. 75). This process has started with the
emergence of the Common Agricultural Policy early
in the life of European cooperation. After decisions
had been taken, there was a need for detailed
implementation measures e.g. for every individual
product. This was done by committees of national
experts who jointly worked for the Commission. That
is how the nebula of comitology came about that then
spread to other policy areas. One prominent example
were the financial services where the Lamfalussy
report created the basis for a similar methodology.
Over an extended period of time an increasing
number of agencies has additionally been formed to
implement EU policies in various areas (a useful
overview is Versluis 2007, pp. 191–204). The man-
agement and board of these agencies is composed of
representatives of member states and of the commis-
sion. In actual practice national services narrowly
cooperate with agency personnel to provide the
required implementation. Finally there is also the
occasional delegation of implementation to private
agencies.
In all these different forms of intertwining there
are different combinations of national, supranational
and functional orientations of the people concerned
(Trondal 2006, pp. 391–416). They all play their role
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in the deliberations that finally result in the different
stages of the European policy cycle. It clearly does
not mean that all policy-making is completely turned
into an exercise of Europeanized policy-making, nor
is the European perspective completely submerged in
the professional and national loyalties that are at
stake. It is an ever differently coloured European
polity that slowly takes shape by unexpected turns
and in sometimes surprising directions. At the same
time the traditional role play between the institutions
at the European level is transformed by additional
networks, restructuring the European level in the
process.
Conclusion
From a geographical perspective the European Union
is by no means a clearcut entity. In a number of
important policy sectors some member states are not
involved. Non-participants vary between sectors. In
some policy sectors non-member states take full part
in the proceedings. Apart from the repeated increase
in the number of member states, there is therefore a
continuously different number of participants in
various important policy sectors and consequently
no salient demarcation of what the union is supposed
to be at any moment in time. Obviously we know
who the member states are. They have signed the
basic treaties but this legal formula does only very
partially cover the daily reality of the EU as a
meaningful social unit to be called a Union. In the
literature the unproblematic existence of the EU as a
clear-cut entity is too much taken for granted.
The political integration process formally estab-
lishing a European level in the system of governance
within the European state system has nonetheless
moved forward for more than a half century incor-
porating this increasing collection of member states.
The process that knew a fairly slow start in the 1950s
and later repeatedly stalled for considerable periods,
knew a quickening pace during the late 1980s and
early 1990s. Integration levels have always differed
considerably between sectors. With some exceptions
due to relative growth spurts of individual sectors,
rank orders in integration levels of sectors have been
maintained, agriculture at the forefront from the
beginning and taxation permanently trailing behind.
Current integration levels do not completely coincide
with positions in the first, second or third pillar
according to the treaties. In no policy sector has a
reverse process of des-integration ever occurred. The
integration process (the transfer of competences to
the European level) is apparently partly based on
system wide dynamics, but additionally each sector is
subjected to specific conditions that cause additional
dynamics that are specific for that sector. In addition,
these may cause spill-overs in adjacent policy sectors.
European decision-making in the confines of the
first pillar involving European level actors and others
is based on repeated games with well established
procedures that result in pretty effective cooperation
through continuous cooperative bargaining. There is
a vital role for ‘diplomatic sherpas’, originating from
circles far beyond the traditional diplomatic corps,
that shuttle between decision-making arenas at
different levels. In the process they form trans-scalar
networks that bridge the original discrete scale levels
and provide new often informal arenas for decision-
making. Very often such networks are policy sector
specific. On the other hand the initially clear distinc-
tions between the operative rules of decision-making
in the various pillars tend to get blurred over time. It
remains to be seen to what extent intersector coor-
dination either at the level of national states or at the
European level will be effective or even feasible in
the future.
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